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CONSENT TO FILING OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties to this appeal have
consented to the filing of this amicus curiae brief.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are constitutional law professors who have special interest in
religious freedom and civil rights. Professor Leslie C. Griffin is the William S.
Boyd Professor of constitutional law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
Boyd School of Law. Erwin Chemerinsky is the founding Dean and
Distinguished Professor of Law, and Raymond Pryke Professor of First
Amendment Law, at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, with a
joint appointment in Political Science. David R. Dow is the Cullen Professor at
the University of Houston Law Center, the Rorschach Visiting Professor of
History at Rice University, and the Founder of the Texas Innocence Network.
Sheldon H. Nahmod is a Distinguished Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute
of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law.
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or
party’s counsel contributed to funding the preparation or the submission of this
brief. Amici are solely responsible for this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
This lawsuit arose from a successful Establishment Clause claim
against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in Scott v. Pierce,
et al., Civil Action No. H-09-3391 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2012). In Scott, the
district court ruled that the State could not deny Jehovah’s Witness William
Scott the opportunity to meet with his coreligionists without a volunteer
present while allowing Muslim prisoners to do so. In direct response to that
ruling, and “solely” because of it, TDCJ cancelled the Muslims’ right to
meet for religious worship without a volunteer present. Brown v. Livingston,
17 F.Supp.3d 616, 628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Instead of curing the original
Establishment Clause violation, as TDCJ contends, that action violated the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment as well as
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Accordingly, amici urge this court to affirm the district
court’s ruling in Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D. Tex. 2014),
which correctly found Establishment, Free Exercise, and RLUIPA violations
in the State’s policy of restricting Muslim prisoners’ religious worship.

2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
when it gave preferential worship opportunities to Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, and Native American prisoners over Muslim inmates, thereby
inhibiting the Appellees’ practice of religion. The Establishment Clause
requires “the principle of denominational neutrality,” Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 246 (1982), and prohibits the government from taking actions
whose “principal or primary effect . . . inhibits religion.” Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). TDCJ contravened both Establishment
Clause standards in this case.
TDCJ’s actions restricting the Muslim prisoners’ worship similarly
infringed upon the fundamental principle of the Free Exercise Clause that
“government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523
(1993). Because Appellees were “denied a reasonable opportunity of
pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow
prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,” a free exercise
violation occurred. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
TDCJ’s policy preventing Muslim prisoners from practicing rituals
central to their faith also violated RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, by

3
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substantially burdening Appellees’ religion without using the least restrictive
means to further a compelling government interest. As this Court lately
explained, “[r]ecent Supreme Court cases . . . have reaffirmed that the
burden on the government in demonstrating the least restrictive means test is
a heavy burden.” McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465,
475-76 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ––– U.S.
–––, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014) and McCullen v.
Coakley, ––– U.S. –––, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540, 189 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2014)).
Appellants’ volunteer policy does not meet that heavy burden. Therefore the
district court’s ruling should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940). Congress instructed prison officials to accommodate prisoners’
religious freedom in RLUIPA. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,465 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[E]xposure to religion is the best hope
we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner. Most prisoners, like it or not, will
eventually be returning to our communities. I want to see a prisoner exposed
to religion while in prison. We should accommodate efforts to bring religion

4
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to prisoners.”); id. at S14,466 (statement of Sen. Dole) (“[I]f religion can
help just a handful of prison inmates get back on track, then the
inconvenience of accommodating their religious beliefs is a very small price
to pay.”). TDCJ’s proposed policy requiring Muslim prisoners to meet only
with a volunteer present, thereby limiting their exercise of religion, violates
the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.
I.

TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause by cancelling the
Muslims’ right to worship without a volunteer present.
The Establishment Clause requires the “principle of denominational

neutrality.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). It also prohibits the
government from taking actions whose “principal or primary effect . . .
inhibits religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). TDCJ’s
policy on Muslim worship violates both Larson’s and Lemon’s
Establishment Clause standards.
A. TDCJ’s policy prefers non-Muslim Protestants, Catholics,
Jews, and Native Americans to Muslims in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (No State may “pass laws which aid one
religion” or that “prefer one religion over another”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
5
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U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects.”); School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (“[t]he fullest realization of true
religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism among
sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”). The Supreme
Court has stated that the prohibition against preferential treatment of religion
is “absolute.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.
The rule of Larson applies when a law or policy discriminates among
religions, as TDCJ’s policy does in this case. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012). Larson requires strict scrutiny. Once the government has
set a policy of denominational preference, “that rule must be invalidated
unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest, [citations
omitted] and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest.” Larson, 456
U.S. at 247. Even in the prison setting, the “overwhelming majority” of
courts that have heard prisoners’ Establishment Clause challenges have
applied strict scrutiny instead of deference toward prison administrators. See
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 187–88 (Tex. 2001); id. at 188, n. 11
(collecting cases applying and not applying the deferential Turner standard
to Establishment Clause cases); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. United States, No.
3:14-CV-00565-HA, 2014 WL 5500495, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2014)

6
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(identifying district courts that have applied strict scrutiny to prisoners’
Larson claims).
During the 1970s, discrimination against Muslims in the Texas prison
system led the State to enter into the consent decree that the State seeks to
vacate in this case. Brown v. Beto, 4:74-CV-0069 (S.D. Tex. 1977). That
consent decree ensured that Muslims received equal treatment with other
non-Muslim prisoners, specifically “equal time for worship services and
other religious activities each week as is enjoyed by adherents to the
Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faiths.” Id. Pursuant to that decree, “Muslim,
Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Native American inmates have all enjoyed
an average of six hours of religious activities each week.” Brown v.
Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 621 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Under TDCJ’s new
policy, however, Muslims receive only one hour per week of religious
programming while the other groups retain their six hours. Id. at 622. The
Establishment Clause prohibits such preference of the Jewish, Catholic,
Protestant, and Native American faiths to Islam.
Jewish and Native American prisoners are similarly preferred to
Muslims in violation of the Establishment Clause because TDCJ grants them
special accommodations unavailable to Muslims. “Jewish inmates are
assigned to four particular units within the prison system specifically to
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bring them closer to Jewish religious volunteers and [] Native American
inmates are assigned to housing units specifically selected to make religious
activities more available to them, while TDCJ makes no effort to house
Muslim inmates in units close to the population centers where Muslim
volunteers might be recruited.” Id. at 631. Thus TDCJ has disobeyed the
“clearest command of the Establishment Clause” by officially preferring
several religious denominations to Islam. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.
Larson requires that TDCJ’s policy “must be invalidated unless it is
justified by a compelling government interest, [citations omitted] and unless
it is closely fitted to further that interest.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. The
State’s usual compelling interests in safety and security in the prison setting
are not relevant to the Larson analysis in this case. First, TDCJ enacted this
policy “solely” in response to Scott v. Pierce and not for any safety- or
security-related reasons. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at 628. Second, the district
court found there were no safety or security violations during the 35 years
that Muslims met without a volunteer present under the Brown v. Beto
consent decree. Id. Third, “the purpose of outside volunteers is to improve
the quality of the services, not provide security.” Id. at 627. Thus the district
court concluded that allowing Muslims to meet without a volunteer present
had “no adverse impact on prison safety or the administration of criminal

8

Case: 14-20249

Document: 00512897060

Page: 15

Date Filed: 01/12/2015

justice. On the other hand, there are security concerns relating to increased
reliance on and use of volunteers.” Id. at 628.
TDCJ’s policy is not closely fitted to a compelling government
interest. TDCJ’s policy cannot survive Larson’s exacting scrutiny; it violates
the Establishment Clause.
B. TDCJ’s policy inhibits Muslim religious exercise in violation of
the Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from taking
actions whose “principal or primary effect . . . advances [or] inhibits
religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Although most of
the case law interpreting Lemon involves government efforts to advance
religion, government action whose “principal or primary effect . . . inhibits
religion” also violates the Establishment Clause, as TDCJ’s policy does
here. Id.; see also Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir.
2007) (“it is far more typical for an Establishment Clause case to challenge
instances in which the government has done something that favors religion
or a particular religious group”). Although the government may not inhibit,
disadvantage, or disapprove of religious practice, “there is ample room for
accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause.” Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713
9
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(2005) (“This Court has long recognized that the government may . . .
accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establishment
Clause.”). Allowing the Muslims to meet without a volunteer present
properly accommodated their religious freedom for 35 years. In contrast,
denying them the opportunity to meet for religious worship inhibits their
religious freedom in violation of the Establishment Clause.
TDCJ’s policy disadvantages and inhibits Muslim religious practice
rather than accommodating it. Muslim inmates in Texas enjoyed equal
access to religious worship for 35 years pursuant to the consent decree in
Brown v. Beto. That policy allowed Muslims ample opportunity to
participate in three religious practices—Jum’ah, Taleem, and Qur’anic
studies—that are required by Islam. Instead of understanding how the
consent decree accommodated religious freedom for 35 years, TDCJ’s new
policy replaced one Establishment Clause violation with another in response
to Scott v. Pierce. The new policy restricted Muslim worship from six hours
to one hour per week and failed to offer Muslims accommodations
previously made for Jews and Native Americans. Because of the new policy,
“Muslim inmates have not had access to Taleem or Qur’anic Studies, except
when they are housed in units that are the home station of one of the five
Muslim Chaplains. Even in those instances, access to all necessary religious

10
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programs is not guaranteed.” Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 626
(S.D. Tex. 2014). The Muslim prisoners’ religion was inhibited by TDCJ’s
new policy.
“When government action violates the Lemon test by inhibiting
religion, the Court’s doctrine obviously works to protect religion from
disadvantage.” Daniel O. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1180 (1988). The district
court’s decision invalidating TDCJ’s policy protects the Muslim religion
from disadvantage; it should be affirmed here.
II.

TDCJ’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause by singling out
Muslims for unfavorable treatment in a non-neutral manner.
Prisoners retain their constitutional right to the free exercise of

religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–50 (1987). This
Court reviews prison regulations that impinge on free exercise under the
deferential standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) and upholds
regulations that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Freeman v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 860-61 (5th Cir.
2004).
The first part of Turner’s four-factor test, namely “whether there is a
rational relationship between the regulation and the legitimate government
interest advanced,” is the most important factor for this Court to consider.
11
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See Scott v. Miss. Dept. of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1992) (a court
need not “weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors,” as
rationality is the controlling standard); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 56465 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In Freeman, we held that the TDCJ's religious
accommodation policy is rationally related to legitimate government
objectives, the first and ‘paramount inquiry under Turner.’”). To survive
Turner’s rationality scrutiny, the government’s policy must be neutral; a
“court ‘must determine whether the government objective underlying the
regulation at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the regulations are
rationally related to that objective.’” Freeman, 369 F.3d at 861 (quoting
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1989)); see also Mayfield v.
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“Turner’s standard also includes a neutrality requirement.”).
TDCJ’s policy prohibiting Muslim inmates from meeting for religious
worship without a volunteer present is not neutral. Therefore its
impingement of prisoner free exercise rights is unconstitutional even under
the deferential Turner standard of review.
As explained in Part I, TDCJ’s policy is non-neutral between Muslims
and members of other religious denominations, including Protestants,
Catholics, Jews, and Native Americans who receive not only more hours of

12
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religious worship but also better housing accommodations to gain access to
volunteers. Because the Muslim inmates were “denied a reasonable
opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded
fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there
was palpable discrimination by the State,” and a free exercise violation
occurred. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
Moreover, TDCJ’s policy is also non-neutral between Muslim
prisoners who desire to exercise religion and other inmates who participate
in secular activities. TDCJ allows prisoners to engage in secular activities
without direct supervision while refusing the same privilege to Muslims.
Numerous inmates meet to play dominoes, to practice foreign languages, to
lead Safe Prison Program classes, to sing for the choir, to practice for the
band, and to work with saws and propane torches in craft shop, all without
direct supervision or a volunteer present. Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d
616, 628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Yet Muslims may not meet to practice their
religion under similar standards. “At a minimum, the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken
for religious reasons.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-34 (1993). TDCJ’s policy both discriminates

13

Case: 14-20249

Document: 00512897060

Page: 20

Date Filed: 01/12/2015

against Muslim religious belief and prohibits conduct undertaken for
religious reasons. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause apply here
and require affirmance of the decision of the district court.
III.

TDCJ’s policy violates RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden
on Muslims’ religious freedom without using the least restrictive
means to further a compelling government interest.
According to RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to [a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility] unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person--(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
TDCJ’s policy violates RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden on
Muslim inmates’ religious freedom without using the least restrictive means
to further a compelling government interest.
Appellees easily meet their burden of establishing a RLUIPA claim
because the 1) religious exercise of their 2) sincerely-held beliefs was 3)
substantially burdened by the government’s action. See Moussazadeh v.
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The
threshold questions for applying RLUIPA are whether a ‘religious exercise’
is at issue and whether the state action places a ‘substantial burden’ on that
14
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exercise. Subsumed within the substantial-burden inquiry is the question
whether the inmate sincerely believes in the requested religious exercises.”).
First, RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” broadly to include “‘any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.’” Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2007).
Appellees were restricted in their ability to practice Jum’ah, Taleem, and
Qur’anic studies, rituals that are “indispensable to a Muslim’s exercise of his
religious beliefs.” Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 625 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (emphasis added). Appellees’ complaint satisfies even the stricter,
pre-RLUIPA definition that the litigated religious exercise must be “central
to a system of religious belief.” Longoria, 507 F.3d at 903 (5th Cir. 2007).
Thus their claim easily satisfies the “religious exercise” element of RLUIPA.
Second, many Appellees have practiced Islam in prison for more than
10 years; the district court concluded that their sincerity is “undisputed” in
this case. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at 625. Thus Appellees have crossed the
sincerity threshold because “the plaintiff’s ‘sincerity’ in espousing that
practice is largely a matter of individual credibility” and is “rarely
challenged” in court. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir.
2013); see also Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d
781, 792 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Though the sincerity inquiry is important, it must
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be handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial shyness.’ We limit ourselves to
‘almost exclusively a credibility assessment’ when determining sincerity. To
examine religious convictions any more deeply would stray into the realm of
religious inquiry, an area into which we are forbidden to tread.”).
Third, this Court has employed a “fact-specific, case-by-case review”
to determine whether TDCJ’s volunteer policy substantially burdens a
plaintiff’s religion and has required the policy to be uniformly and neutrally
applied. McAlister v. Livingston, 348 Fed.Appx. 923, 936-37 (5th Cir.
2009); see also Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 613-14 (discussing previous Fifth
Circuit cases examining TDCJ’s volunteer policy under RLUIPA and First
Amendment); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723-24 (2005) (Like the
Establishment Clause, RLUIPA does not allow the state to “differentiate
among bona fide faiths” or “single out a particular sect for special
treatment.”). As argued above in Parts I and II, TDCJ’s policy is not neutral
between Muslims and Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Native Americans and
inmates who meet for secular reasons. Thus under this Court’s precedents,
the Appellees’ religion is substantially burdened by the policy’s lack of
neutrality.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently warned that in assessing
whether a plaintiff’s religion is substantially burdened, “it is not for us to say
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that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our ‘narrow
function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects
an honest conviction.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2779 (2014) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). Here, as in Hobby Lobby, “there is no dispute”
that Appellees share an honest conviction that the loss of “indispensable”
religious rituals (Jum’ah, Taleem, and Qur’anic studies) has substantially
burdened their religion. Id.
Because Appellees have established that their religion was
substantially burdened by the government’s regulatory scheme, “the burden
is on the government to establish that the regulation (1) advances a
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.” McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764
F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 2014). TDCJ cannot satisfy either prong of
RLUIPA’s test.
RLUIPA, like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb, requires “the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law
‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is
being substantially burdened.” Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 592-93 (5th
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Cir. 2009) (quoting Gonzales v. O Central Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006)); see also McAllen Grace Brethren
Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2014) (the governmental
interest cannot be “couched in very broad terms” but must be “focused” on
the particular claimant whose interest is substantially burdened); Tagore v.
United States, 735 F.3d 324, 330-31 (5th Cir. 2013) (“RFRA requires the
government to explain how applying the statutory burden ‘to the person’
whose sincere exercise of religion is being seriously impaired furthers the
compelling governmental interest.”).
In this case, the government’s usual compelling interest in prison
safety and security is not focused on these particular claimants. TDCJ
enacted this policy “solely” in response to Scott v. Pierce and not for any
safety- or security-related reasons. Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616,
628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Moreover, there were no reported safety or security
violations during the 35 years that Muslims met without a volunteer present
under the Brown v. Beto consent decree while, during the same period, some
security incidents occurred while guards or volunteers were directly
supervising other religious groups. Id. at 621. Indeed, the presence of
volunteers may increase security risks. “Chaplain Pierce testified that the
purpose of outside volunteers is to improve the quality of the services, not
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provide security. Therefore, TDCJ administrator’s contention that the
presence of an outside volunteer furthers its compelling state interest in
prison security is unfounded and contradicted by the evidence.” Id. at 627.
Because TDCJ offered no “specific evidence that [the particular Muslim
claimants’] religious practices jeopardize its stated interests,” it does not
have a compelling interest that satisfies RLUIPA. Merced v. Kasson, 577
F.3d 578, 587-88, 592 (5th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has recently explained that cost is not a
compelling interest that justifies the government’s decision to restrict
religious freedom:
both RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some
circumstances require the Government to expend additional
funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs. Cf. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc–3(c) (RLUIPA: “[T]his chapter may require a
government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.”). HHS’s
view that RFRA can never require the Government to spend
even a small amount reflects a judgment about the importance
of religious liberty that was not shared by the Congress that
enacted that law.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014). TDCJ
may be required to incur expenses in support of the important value of
prisoners’ religious freedom.
Even if this Court assumes that prison administrators have a
compelling interest in safety and security, TDCJ did not employ the least
19
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restrictive means of attaining that interest. This Court has recently
recognized that “least restrictive means” is an “exceptionally demanding”
test that places a “heavy burden” on the government. McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2014); see also
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[t]he phrase ‘least restrictive means’ has its plain meaning.”). “The very
existence of a government-sanctioned exception to a regulatory scheme that
is purported to be the least restrictive means can, in fact, demonstrate that
other, less-restrictive alternatives could exist.” McAllen, 764 F.3d at 475-76.
Numerous government-sanctioned alternatives that are less restrictive
of religious freedom are available in this case. TDCJ could pursue the
consent-decree strategy that successfully allowed Muslim prisoners to meet
without a volunteer present for 35 years. See Newby v. Quarterman, 325
Fed.Appx. 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (The “fact that Muslims regularly
engage in communal worship without an approved religious volunteer is
some evidence that the security and safety concerns identified by Texas can
be addressed through less restrictive alternatives.”). The less restrictive,
indirect supervision that worked for those 35 years continues to be employed
in other settings in Texas prisons today. Such indirect supervision includes
closed-circuit observation, audio and video recordings of prisoners’
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meetings, and roving patrols of security guards who look through windows
at prisoners’ meetings. See Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 621
(S.D. Tex. 2014); see also Inzunza v. Moore, No. 2:09-CV-0048, 2011 WL
1211434, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (identifying possible alternatives
that Muslim groups are “under visual and audio supervision at all times and
the services are audio taped”); McKennie v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice,
No. A-09-CV-906-LY, 2012 WL 443948, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2012)
(considering testimony that volunteer groups could be policed by roving
officers, listening devices, or video monitors). Those indirect supervisory
practices have worked effectively for many years not only in Texas, but also
in other jurisdictions like Florida and New York. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at
627. “Chaplain Shabazz testified that many prison systems throughout the
United States have adopted the Brown v. Beto regime, employing indirect
supervision of inmate-led religious activities thereby permitting Muslim
inmates full participation in religious activities.” Id. Because these less
restrictive means permit full Muslim participation in religious activities,
RLUIPA does not permit TDCJ to enact the more restrictive volunteerspresent policy.
In sum, TDCJ “has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving
its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of
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religion by the objecting parties in these cases.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). Therefore, its policy violates
RLUIPA and should not be imposed on Appellees.
CONCLUSION
TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
when it gave preferential worship opportunities to Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, and Native American prisoners over Muslim inmates, thereby
inhibiting the Appellees’ practice of religion. TDCJ’s actions restricting the
Muslim prisoners’ worship similarly infringed upon the fundamental
principle of the Free Exercise Clause that government not suppress religious
practice in a discriminatory manner. TDCJ’s policy preventing Muslim
prisoners from practicing rituals central to their faith also violated RLUIPA,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, by substantially burdening Appellees’ religion
without using the least restrictive means to further a compelling government
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interest. Therefore amici respectfully request this Court to affirm the ruling
of the district court.
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